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•#OUR INCREDIBLE 
Sh r i n k i n g  D i s c o u r s e
Jacob  A ppe l 
2010 M o n t a n a  P r iz e  in  
C r e a t i v e  N o n f i c t i o n
I received my first death threat on March 
5, 2009. I ’d logged into my home computer after 
a long workday at the hospital, hoping for an 
email message from the comedic actress who was 
my crush du jo u r. Instead, 1 discovered a flurry 
o f symposia announcements and reprint requests 
and— at the very bottom o f  my screen— a personal 
message from an unfam iliar email account. The 
content contained a reply to an article that 1 
had recently written for an obscure website, in 
which 1 had argued that couples using taxpayer 
dollars to fund in vitro fertilization should be 
required to test their embryos for potentially fatal 
genetic diseases. That's a relatively controversial 
viewpoint in my professional field, bioethics, yet 
not exactly a casus be lli, or even a voting issue, 
for ordinary Americans. M y correspondent,
“ Hazmanx99,”  cogently expressed his (or her) 
concern that mandatory genetic screening was the 
moral equivalent o f  H itle r’s efforts to euthanize 
the disabled. There was no mistaking, or 
forgetting, Hazmanx99’s animus: 1 rarely receive 
messages that begin w ith the salutation, “ You 
Nazi Fuck,”  and conclude w ith v iv id  descriptions 
o f my impending dismemberment.
M y in itia l instinct was to answer 
Hazmanx99— to explain that, far from wishing 
to k ill o f f  those with disabilities, 1 have for years 
advocated on their behalf. A fte r all, 1 did not relish 
the prospect o f a total stranger believing me a 
genocidal maniac. So 1 penned a friendly missive, 
intending to disarm my mysterious nemesis with 
a blend o f logic, hum ility and good cheer. 1 
confess that, in my naivete, 1 fantasized that we 
might eventually achieve a rapprochement in the 
spirit o f Norman M ailer and W illiam  Styron. 1 
even included a light-hearted postscript: “ Why 
‘99’? Are there ninety-eight other ‘ Hazmanxes’?
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And what is the plural of ‘Hazmanx’ anyway?” 1 
never heard back.
I wish I could report that my “encounter” 
with the ninety-ninth Hazmanx was an isolated 
incident. Instead, s/he proved to be a pioneer. 
When I started publishing a regular ethics column 
in the Huffington Post later that spring, I found 
myself inundated with email—and occasional 
“snail mail”—distinguished by varying degrees 
o f hostility. Some o f these messages seemed 
genuinely amusing in their irony, such as a short 
note 1 received from a “pro-life” abortion opponent 
named Mike Kanavel who wrote that “1 hope you 
fucking choke on your own vomit in your sleep.” 
Others were more alarming, primarily because 
their authors should have known better, such as 
a diatribe from disbarred attorney and perennial 
Washington state political candidate Stan 
Lippmann, entitled “Nazi Moron Scumbag,” who 
cautioned that “half of all Americans” were ready 
to string me up as a “genocidal War Criminal”
(sic). Admittedly, the topics that 1 address can 
be contentious: not merely abortion and assisted 
suicide, but fetal organ donation and bestiality and 
reproductive cloning. However, only a minority 
of the nine bona fide threats of physical violence 
that I’ve received actually relate to topics that I 
would ever have expected to inflame passions. 
By far the most frightening message to appear in 
my inbox— and the only time that I’ve seriously 
considered contacting the police— came from a 
man irate that I'd opined in favor of fluoridating 
the water supply.
I have made a point o f keeping these threats 
in perspective. 1 am an utterly minor intellectual, 
after all— or possibly even, as one ex-girlfriend 
pointedly informed me, an utterly minor pseudo- 
intellectual. If someone truly wants to strike a 
blow against entrenched liberalism, they’re going 
to go after Noam Chomsky or Gloria Steinem— 
not an armchair philosopher who publishes jargon- 
laced articles in the Journal ofB ioethical Inquiry
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and the Cambridge Quarterly o f  Healthcare 
Ethics. One o f my dearest friends, an authority 
on Iranian-American relations, encouraged me to 
expunge my apartment’s address and telephone 
number from the Internet before some unhinged 
lunatic appeared upon my stoop. I f  you 're not 
willing to protect yourse lf he warned, consider 
your innocent neighbors.
Needless to say, such excessive privacy 
has a downside. It is not that 1 fear “ letting the 
terrorists win,” so to speak. I am fully reconciled 
to my own cowardice, deeply proud o f my 
preference for self-preservation over principle. 
What I am unwilling to do is to forgo the letters 
that I receive from individuals who agree with me 
or, more importantly, who have sincere questions 
about my views. These have included, on two 
occasions, hand-written queries from elderly 
correspondents who have read my articles in 
the public library, but lacking computer savvy 
and email accounts, have asked the librarian to
look up my postal address on-line. This pair o f 
notes was worth all the stress o f being ordered 
by an irate correspondent “never to show [my] 
ugly face” in the state o f Kentucky. Besides, I 
reassured myself, threatening someone over the 
Internet isn't really threatening them, is it? It’s 
more akin to online sex— which an increasing 
number o f spouses do not appear to view as 
cheating. After all, cyberspace envelops a person 
like an alcoholic stupor, simultaneously inflaming 
and disinhibiting. Who hasn't written something 
in an email message that he would never have 
uttered face to face? For all 1 knew, the ninety- 
ninth Hazmanx, whose tag-name increasingly 
reminded me o f an apocalyptic prophet, was 
verily an elderly, church-going widow on the Isle 
o f M an...about to celebrate her centennial.
Then the package arrived: a box the 
size o f a toaster, wrapped in brown paper. I 
returned home from a New Year’s party to find 
the nondescript parcel resting on my welcome
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mat. No card. No return address. Just my name, 
scrawled with black magic m arker across the side 
in the bold lettering o f  a child or a psychopath. I 
carried the parcel into my apartm ent— it felt too 
heavy for its bulk, like a dead cat— and 1 was on 
the verge o f  opening it, when I noticed a strand 
o f  wire poking through the side. I inspected 
the wire m om entarily: it was a twisted, copper- 
colored strip o f  metal— how the end o f  a coat 
hanger m ight appear after being unfolded to open 
a locked car door. Or, it suddenly struck me, this 
was what a m akeshift explosive m ight look like.
1 had written a colum n earlier that day in 
which 1 urged that the “age o f  consent” be reduced 
to the age o f  sixteen. I now wondered: Had some 
deranged opponent o f  teenage sexuality left me a 
“parting gift” in protest? O r was this payback for 
my earlier defense o f  an open-borders imm igration 
policy? Sim ultaneously, another portion o f  my 
brain insisted that 1 was reacting irrationally, that 
the package m ight just as easily be a gift from
a neighbor or a forgotten purchase from Hbay. 1 
d idn’t have the confidence to call the police and 
report the parcel as suspicious, but I also lacked 
the courage to open the box and risk losing a 
hand. So I chose a m iddle course: I hurled the 
package across my apartm ent with full force. If 
it were a bomb, 1 reasoned, a collision with the 
far wall would either incapacitate the device—  
or the ensuing explosion, at the opposite end o f 
the room, was less likely to injure me. That was 
utterly asinine, o f  course. As I’ve subsequently 
learned, a well-m ade bomb that size could easily 
have taken down the entire ceiling. But, to my 
relief, the package did not detonate.
I tentatively retrieved the package. A 
pungent liquid seeped through the gash around 
the wire— and I recoiled at the smell. 1 will never 
shake the indelible m em ory o f  realizing that, 
instead o f  a bomb. I’d been sent acid. W asn’t that 
the weapon o f  choice that fundam entalists used 
against wom en in Iraq and Pakistan? Seconds
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later, o f course, 1 recognized the aroma. Wine!
Closer inspection o f the now-dripping package
revealed shards o f glass and a sopping card. One
of my former writing students had hand-delivered
two bottles o f  cabernet in a wire basket.
*  *  *
Our intellectual discourse is contracting.
What 1 mean to express by this expansive 
declaration is actually two distinct phenomena 
that are all too often conflated by free-thought 
advocates. The more obvious concern is that the 
robust exchange o f conflicting ideas, so essential 
to social progress, has been dampened by the rise 
o f ad hominem attacks in nearly every academic 
and cultural discipline. Increasingly, we engage 
only with people who agree with us. Those who 
disagree are not merely mistaken— but downright 
evil. Technological advances, such as the Internet, 
which in theory offer the potential o f increased 
dialogue, have instead largely become forums for 
polarized attack and vitriolic counterattack. As
soon as our mouths open, our minds close.
A second concern— one largely ignored 
by the media— is that the actual breadth and 
variety o f ideas acceptable in public conversation 
is beginning to narrow. After a half-century of 
liberalization in the United States and Western 
Europe, during which previously taboo subjects 
entered the forum of debate, particularly in the 
fields o f human sexuality and bioethics, our 
range o f discourse now actually appears to be 
contracting. Having broken down a millennium 
o f moral barriers in the course o f one generation, 
we increasingly seem to have accepted that 
certain remaining barriers should not be broken. 
On subjects ranging from neonatal euthanasia 
and eugenics to child pornography and Holocaust 
revisionism, we have concluded— to our own 
detriment— that some ideas should not be 
expressed at all.
The demonization o f  Princeton 
University’s Peter Singer, and his response, otYers
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a case study in how these two distinct phenomena 
can coalesce. Professor Singer, whether one 
adm ires or abhors his uncom prom ising utilitarian 
outlook, is the m ost significant philosopher o f  our 
era. 1 do not think it’s a stretch to contend that 
one m ust look back several centuries— before 
Freud, before Marx, possibly as long ago as 
Immanuel Kant— to find a thinker who reshaped 
the intellectual landscape o f  his age so rapidly 
and so com prehensively. Singer has written 
passionately for the rights o f  anim als and traveled 
the globe crusading against poverty. However, 
he may be best known for what is arguably his 
most controversial view, first annunciated in 
Practical Ethics, that term inating the lives o f 
severely disabled newborns may, under certain 
circum stances, be both ethical and desirable. 
The outcry against Singer that has followed him 
since he first expressed this view in the late 1970s 
has been intense, personal and often violent. 
Its most dram atic m oment, which Singer has
him self written about extensively, occurred at 
the University o f  Zurich in 1989, when enraged 
disability rights advocates forcibly prevented him 
from delivering a lecture. Rather than challenging 
S inger’s ideas with their own, which he welcom ed 
them to do, these protesters sought to drive his 
ideas underground. Neonatal euthanasia is a 
concept so dangerous, they believed, it could not 
be tolerated long enough to refute its justification 
on the merits. In short, by refusing to engage in 
debate, S inger’s opponents attem pted to shrink 
the public discourse.
M uch has been written about the ugly 
cam paign against Professor Singer. I say against 
Singer— not against his ideas— because figures 
as diverse as libertarian publisher Steven Forbes 
and Marc M aurer o f  the National Federation o f 
the Blind argued against his appointm ent to the 
Princeton faculty and sought his intellectual 
ostracism. W hat has been largely overlooked 
is the subtle success o f  this cam paign. Singer
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has not retracted his opinions nor has Princeton 
retracted his tenure. At the sam e tim e, he no 
longer hard-pedals his view s on personhood. 
Instead, he has devoted his later w ritings to 
charitable donation and the horrors o f  poverty. 
1 doubt Professor Singer would agree that he 
has been “ silenced.” As an independent (and 
adm iring) observer, I cannot help believing 
that he has been “ tem pered” by his detractors. 
That m oderation is certainly understandable: 
As a practical m atter, em phasizing this one 
controversial view  threatened his opportunity  to 
cham pion o ther causes o f  great value. (Lost to 
m any o f  his opponents was the possibility  that 
they m ight disagree with Singer on one issue, but 
agree w ith him on others.) A las, the result is that 
neonatal euthanasia lost its intellectual cham pion. 
Equally disturbing, others in the field o f  moral 
philosophy have been reluctant to em brace 
S inger’s view s on the m atter— at least publicly. 
1 know o f  several b ioethicists who have privately
expressed to me their sym pathy tow ard S in g er’s 
theory o f  personhood— but refuse to do so openly, 
for fear o f  the backlash.
I do not m ean to suggest, in highlighting 
S in g er’s case, that only ideas o f  one particularly  
ideology have been driven from the com m unal 
square. W hen 1 first started teaching at Brown 
U niversity  a decade ago, an uproar ensued over 
the decision o f  the student new spaper to publish a 
highly controversial advertisem ent by conservative 
provocateur David H orow itz entitled, “Ten 
Reasons W hy R eparations for B lacks is a Bad 
Idea for Blacks— and Racist Too.” A m ong the 
prem ises advanced by H orow itz was the argum ent 
that “ trillions o f  dollars in transfer paym ents have 
been m ade to A frican-A m ericans in the form  o f  
w elfare benefits and racial p references” since the 
1960s, e lim inating any need for affirm ative action, 
and that A frican-A m ericans should be grateful 
to w hites for their freedom  and “ high standard 
o f  living.” Several student groups responded
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by “appropriating” (some might say stealing) 
the entire run o f the Brown Daily Herald. As 
someone who disagrees with all ten of Horowitz’s 
Reasons, and his worldview more generally, 1 
found this act o f civil disobedience appalling. 
Not, as many o f my colleagues did, because theft 
is inherently wrong or immoral. Rather, my 
concern was that by removing Horowitz’s ideas 
from the public debate— however misguided 1 
might think them—one ceded the intellectual and 
moral vigor that would have come with refuting 
them. In other words, those who sought to silence 
Horowitz, rather than challenging his case on the 
merits, were also silencing themselves. Unlike 
Professor Singer, Horowitz has not since been 
tempered in his views. At the same time, he has 
drifted from the “mainstream” to a position where 
he now attacks the liberal intelligentsia, rather 
than attempting to engage with it. That is our loss 
as much as his.
Unfortunately, ideas are dangerous. The
judges who voted to execute Socrates understood 
this, as did the Genevese elders who expelled 
Calvin. Our better selves would prefer to believe 
in the efficiency of the “marketplace o f ideas”—  
that idealistic notion, often attributed to Supreme 
Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., that if 
philosophies and ideologies compete freely, the 
most worthy thoughts will gain acceptance. At 
the same time, in our more cynical moments we 
recognize the Orwellian truth that, if you can 
take away the words for expressing an idea, and 
the public forum in which to promote it, you 
can eventually eradicate the idea itself. In free 
societies, that is the inherent tension that governs 
disputes over the right to uncensored speech. 
What if the “wrong” ideas prove persuasive? Can 
we risk allowing the Holocaust deniers or the Flat- 
Earthers their say? Should we allow those who 
oppose free expression to use our liberties against 
us? Increasingly, over the past two decades, we 
have answered NO. Occasionally, western nations
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have resorted to raw political force— such as 
Ireland’s new blasphemy statute or the nineteen- 
year-old French ban on “ inciting religious and 
racial hatred’’ that has repeatedly been used to 
fine Brigette Bardot. Far more often, however, 
legal action has been unnecessary. All that has 
been required is an increasing unwillingness— in 
the universities, in the media, in our daily lives—  
to engage with ideas that we do not like. We no 
longer need fatw as  or royal edicts to tell us not to 
speak or think subversively. Most o f us manage 
to avoid doing so with little effort.
In his path-breaking and ingenious book 
How We Decide, Jonah Lehrer— who is rapidly 
becoming for neuroscience what Carl Sagan once 
was for astronomy— summarizes a moral scenario 
first created by psychologist Jonathan Haidt:
“Julie and Mark are siblings 
vacationing together in the south 
o f France. One night, after a 
lovely day spent exploring the
local countryside, they share a 
delicious dinner and a few bottles 
o f red wine. One thing leads to 
another and Julie and Mark decide 
to have sex. Although she’s on the 
pill, Mark uses a condom just in 
case. They enjoy themselves very 
much, but decide not to have sex 
again. The siblings promise to 
keep the one-night affair secret and 
discover, over time, that having 
sex brought them even closer 
together. Did Julie and Mark do 
something wrong?”
According to Lehrer, most people do believe 
the siblings to have acted wrongly. However, 
the reasons that they offer to explain this 
judgm ent— “the risk o f having kids with genetic 
abnormalities” and “that sex will damage the 
sibling relationship”— are overtly incompatible 
with the stated scenario, which includes multiple 
forms o f birth control and a closer familial bond. 
The problem revealed here is not simply that
people d on’t read as carefully as they should. 
W hat is alarm ing is that, because the ethics o f  
consensual incest are largely outside the bounds 
o f  polite discussion, m ost people who oppose 
such relations cannot explain why they hold their 
views. I do not intend to endorse brother-sister 
sex. Nor, for that matter, am 1 staking out a position 
against it. My concern is that enlightened adults 
should be able to debate the question intelligently. 
O therwise, we risk m istaking the fam iliar for the 
moral.
The most dangerous ideas are not those 
that challenge the status quo. The m ost dangerous 
ideas are those so em bedded in the status quo , 
so wrapped in a cloud o f  inevitability, that we 
forget they are ideas at all. W hen we forget that 
the underpinning o f  our society are conscious 
choices, we becom e woefully unable to challenge 
those choices. We also becom e ill-equipped to 
defend them.
* * *
Euripides exhorted his audiences: 
“Q uestion everything.”
M y favorite exercise, when teaching 
bioethics, is to ask my students to list ten 
questions that “cannot be asked” in contem porary 
America. As an exam ple, 1 write on the chalk 
board: “ W hy shouldn’t adm ission to elite
colleges and universities be auctioned o ff to the 
highest bidders?” 1 have found that the very 
question infuriates some Ivy Leaguers so much 
that they want to debate it immediately, rather 
than listing other objectionable inquiries. Soon 
my most prom ising students are form ulating 
questions o f  their own: “Should smart people
be paid to have more babies?” “ W hat’s wrong 
with exposing children to pornography?” “ Is 
patriotism  im m oral?” I am consistently amazed 
and impressed with the ability o f  my students to 
challenge social norm s and moral conventions—  
when doing so as part o f  a classroom  exercise. 1 
am not confident that many o f  them continue to
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pose such questions over the d inner table.
W hich leads me back to Hazm anx99. 
The real harm  done by the H azm anxes Mike 
K anavals and Stan L ippm anns o f  the world is 
that they inevitably m ake m e less likely to engage 
w ith those who share their view s and disagree 
w ith mine. The autom ated reply to Peter S in g er’s 
email reads: “ M any people send me m essages 
with questions about, or com m ents on, my views. 
A lthough 1 read all such m essages, 1 regret that 1 
rarely have tim e to reply to them .” 1 suspect, after 
enough overt threats, he also lacks the inclination. 
At the sam e tim e, m uch as a person never forgets 
his first love or his first jo b  or his first encounter 
w ith illness, my first authentic death threat will 
alw ays hold a special place in my heart. To me, 
it is a rem inder that, unless we continue to pose 
indecent questions and to raise taboo subjects, 
we are liable to find ourselves thinking “outside 
the box” o f  acceptable thought— without having 
m oved at all. That is a far greater threat to our
moral w elfare than all the radical b ioethicists 
and right-w ing provocateurs and anonym ous 
cyberspace bullies com bined.
Or I could be wrong.
